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n 2015 the United Nations General Assembly is expected to propose a new 
development cooperation framework and to draw up a list of universal 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) to be achieved by the year 2030. 
This event is a unique occasion to put environmental challenges at the heart 
of a universal agenda of development model transformation. It offers the 
opportunity to re-open discussions on the socio-economic trajectories of 
countries and their environmental impacts. 
The SDGs will dramatically change the international official development 
assistance (ODA) agenda. They cover many more topics than the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) that were established in 2000. The SDGs 
are more ambitious – for example they include ‘zero poverty’ and ‘zero hunger’1 
objectives – and they are placed within a universal perspective. The widening and 
deepening of the development agenda raises specific questions on implementation, 
particularly regarding funding. 
The issue of development financing has been the subject of a separate report 
(United Nations, 2014), in which an intergovernmental committee of experts 
(ICESDF) examined the issue and drew up an inventory of funding needs and 
sources. In the report’s final section it outlines some options for an integrated 
strategy. The ICESDF report is relatively consensual and draws to a close the cycle 
of discussions between finance experts on what we might call ‘technical’ issues; 
while it opens a cycle of a different nature – a political one, punctuated by the Addis 
Ababa conference in July 2015 and by the discussions on the financing of climate 
1.  The list of SDGs is not fixed; we therefore refer here to the most recent document produced by the Open Working Group, 
dated 12 August 2014: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html
Financing for sustainable development is one of the major subjects 
of negotiation on the ‘post-2015’ agenda and a key to its imple-
mentation. The most commonly proposed technical options are 
presented here, and their relevance discussed in relation to the 
constraints specific to certain sectors and countries – particularly 
the least developed countries.
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policies ahead of the COP 21 in Paris, and the finalization of the list of SDGs and 
the resources required with respect to those goals. 
During this pivotal period that is now opening, the purpose of this article is to 
present the technical elements that make up the major reports on development 
financing, and to consider them in a political perspective that is relevant for the 
planning of ODA within the global development financing ecosystem. 
Framing the financial debate: what the recent studies 
tell us
The ICESDF report should be understood as a common and solid working basis from 
which to expect all cooperation actors to produce a number of concrete proposals in 
terms of resource mobilization and efficiency. In view of the adoption of the SDGs 
and the Addis Ababa conference, the works of the committee have resulted in the 
production of a set of intellectual outputs that have recently enriched the discus-
sions through complementary reports and accounts.2 
All highlight that the funding issue is not limited to a quantitative assessment 
of the needs and resources that are available, or are potentially available. Most of 
the major reports do not, however, resist the tempting and yet perilous exercise of 
carrying out such a quantification; and many find that the issue is not so much about 
‘how much’ or ‘why’, but more to do with ‘how’.
They place particular importance on the mobilization and utilization of domestic 
public resources through the identification of specific needs in terms of efficiency 
(capacity building of tax administrations, fighting against corruption) and/or the 
tax base (the ICESDF especially encourages the taxation of CO2 emissions). The 
focus is then put onto the strengthening of local tax administrations and the fight 
against the illicit funding flows out of developing countries.
These resources should encourage local public authorities to mobilize private 
resources for the financing of long-term sustainable development, in particular 
by improving access to financial services and the promotion of business loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The complexity of the issue is not so 
much related to the recommended ‘recipes’, but more to do with the conditions of 
application to difficult environments. In countries with the least well-established 
banking sectors one solution consists of promoting the development of innovative 
payment systems such as mobile banking (Guillaumont-Jeanneney/Kpodar, 
FERDI, forthcoming).
The same applies for private external resources, including foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Here the central question concerns how to direct these funds 
to finance sustainable development. In the absence of a real response, the various 
reports identify the necessary conditions, as well as the potential sources of financing 
2. See OECD (2014), SDSN (2014), the European Report on development (Financing and other means of implementation 
in the post-2015 context, forthcoming) and FERDI (Financing sustainable development by addressing vulnerabilities, 
forthcoming).
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for sustainable development and global public goods: pension funds, insurance 
companies, sovereign wealth funds (OECD, 2014), or for the IMF to finance the 
Green Climate Fund through the creation of annual reserve assets in the form of 
additional Special Drawing Rights (Giraud, FERDI, forthcoming). The remittances 
of migrants are often mentioned as an underutilized resource that international 
cooperation should promote through addressing transfer costs and by providing 
suitable financial innovations to direct these funds effectively.3 
Most reports recognize that ODA still has an important role as long as concessional 
public resources are used where most needed, especially in favour of the least 
developed countries (LDCs).4 At the same time, the question of how to ensure that 
the funding effort is fairly distributed between public stakeholders naturally arises. 
While most reports only mention a ‘need for all stakeholders to take responsibility’ 
in the financing of SDGs, the OECD (2014) proposes to increase the effort of each 
country to 2% of GDP (ODA included) and the Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network proposes a formula to determine the distribution of contributions to fight 
against climate change (Sachs and Schmidt-Traub, forthcoming).
Beyond the discussion on the amount of financing, the debate on development 
financing offers an opportunity to observe the progress of the construction of 
international cooperation efficiency, South-South and triangular in particular. 
While the ICESDF mentions the invitation from the United Nations to its General 
Secretary to take ‘concrete actions’ to strengthen this type of collaboration, the 
differences in the design of international cooperation between traditional and 
emerging donors may be an obstacle: while the former cooperate according to rules 
that are common to Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, a sort of 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ on development5, the latter see international cooperation 
through the prism of the comparative advantages of each partner (Lin, CCER Beijing, 
FERDI, forthcoming).  
The accounting equation and its limitations
The ICESDF has evaluated the financing needs to be between $135 billion and $195 
billion per year to eradicate extreme poverty, between $5 trillion and $7 trillion to 
cover investment needs in infrastructure, to which is added $2.5 trillion to $3.5 
trillion for the development of SMEs (United Nations, 2014, p. 10).
This raises at least three types of questions: 
 m What is the scientific value of the measurement of these ‘needs’? What method of 
calculation and what economic rationality underlie them? Does the measurement 
3.  Docquier (FERDI, forthcoming) estimates that the proportion of migrant remittances in the GDP of low-income countries 
is already significant and – at the very least – should not decrease. Depending on the international migration scenario, 
this amount could be multiplied by four by 2100, or perhaps even by ten in an optimistic scenario.
4.  The OECD proposes to target LDCs and fragile states with funding of up to 0.25% of the GDP of each donor state; Serge 
Tomasi proposes to allocate between 50% and 70% of ODA to the poorest countries (FERDI, forthcoming).
5.  Hiroshi Kato (JICA, FERDI, forthcoming) emphasizes the importance of knowledge sharing between actors and the 
potential role of traditional donors in a triangular scheme of cooperation, including on the basis of the experience of their 
development practitioners.  
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of financing needs – for roads, schools, vaccines, salaries, risk premiums, etc. – 
have any relevance on a global level? 
 m Assuming that such a measurement gives us relevant and useful information, 
how can such a financial windfall be mobilized and channelled into projects or 
policies for poverty reduction, access to care, sustainable economic growth… (to 
mention only a few of the SDGs, the negotiation of which continues), given that 
such projects and policies (which although have high social returns) are weak 
and uncertain in terms of the returns on private investment?
 m Finally, how can we ensure that the use of these funds is focused on long-term 
sustainable development?
The usefulness of such evaluations is questionable, firstly from a scientific 
point of view. Methodologies are unclear or approximate because they are based 
on assumptions that consider the future as a continuation of the present, even 
though recent crises have shown that changes in current trends are both likely 
and unpredictable. From a political perspective, some consider the results to be 
counterproductive because the financial sums arrived at are huge. While for others 
these figures enable the manoeuvre room and necessary changes to be put into 
perspective, along with the allocation criteria for loans and grants, and public and 
private funding, which depend on the extent of local or global public goods that 
make up each basket of needs (Figure 1).
Estimates of the order of magnitude found in the literature and compiled by the 
ICESDF are that the annual needs are at least twenty times higher than the annual 
ODA amount, which reached a record level in 2013 of $134 billion. This ODA will 
grow only slightly – due to the current and future burden on the public finances of 
donor countries – and will never equate to the financing needs in the broadest sense. 
It is possible that the announcement of the new goals will have a mobilization effect 
– such an effect occurred between 2000 and 2005 following the launch of the MDGs 
and the implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative – 
but it is unlikely to cause a bifurcation or a profound change in the long-term trend 
of net ODA, which follows a very steady trajectory.
One of the possible options to increase the amount of international public funding 
is the use of innovative financing mechanisms focused on international taxation. 
Although the idea of using such mechanisms is often raised during discussions, there 
have not yet been any significant developments in this field. The airline ticket tax, 
which remains national but involves several countries, is a step in this direction, 
but its magnitude is limited. Similarly, the tax on financial transactions proposed 
by the European Commission that will come into force in January 2016, part of the 
revenue of which must be allocated to assistance, lost even more of its ambition at a 
recent meeting of Finance Ministers of the eleven European countries that support 
the initiative. The revenue generated will therefore be limited, as will no doubt the 
proportion allocated to assistance.
The bulk of the additional funds required to cover the financing needs of the 
post-2015 agenda must therefore come from other sources of long-term financing 
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– pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, among other 
institutional investors. The ICESDF has stated that public and private savings 
amount to $22 trillion and financial assets amount to $218 trillion: a reallocation 
of a share of these sums would theoretically cover all of the estimated needs (United 
Nations, 2014, p. 11). Again, one may wonder about the changes that the SDGs 
will trigger – will their announcement help to redirect a small proportion of these 
available savings? And if so, why? Can SDGs serve as credible guidelines for decision-
makers to ensure that the public policies of each country promote more efficient 
allocation mechanisms (from a sustainable development perspective)? What are 
these mechanisms, or what should they be?
The UN estimates that institutional investors alone hold between $75 trillion and 
$85 trillion of financial assets. Pension funds, life insurance companies and sovereign 
wealth funds ($60 trillion in assets) have financial tools (long-term liabilities) 
that are compatible with the long-term horizon required for some investments 
in the post-2015 agenda (UNGA, 2014). As highlighted in the UN report on the 
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration (UNGA, 
FIGURE 1 The investment requirements associated with the post-2015 agenda
The estimation of funding needs for some major goals or sectors raises numerous conceptual and methodological difficulties. The 
orders of magnitude proposed here are taken from the report of UN experts on sustainable development (GIEFDD) based on a literature 
review of institutions or organizations that conducted this estimation exercise for a specific sector or topic (IEA, UNCTAD, Lancet...)]
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2014), these ‘long-term investors today do not invest enough in the long term direct 
investment necessary for sustainable development, both in developing countries 
and rich countries – regardless of the institutional and regulatory framework. For 
example, the overall infrastructure investment represents less than 3% of the assets 
of pension funds’ (UNGA, 2014, p. 7; Table 1). 
The obstacles are well known and the subject of much analysis – weak local 
regulatory and institutional frameworks, lack of data, inappropriate risk sharing and 
transfer, etc. (OECD, 2013; World Bank, 2014b). However, the solutions to overcome 
these problems will come from major principles rather than implementation. This 
is examined below.
It should, however, be noted that sums that are mobilized domestically 
in developing countries currently exceed international funding (European 
Commission, 2013). According to data gathered by the European Commission, 
the ratio of domestic public resources and international resources is around 20:1 
(Figure 2). The overall total of international public finance dedicated to developing 
countries only represents 2% of the available funds in these countries. Domestic 
FIGURE 2 Domestic public financing in developing countries
On average, official development assistance flows represent one quarter of the funding sources of LDCs, while private domestic 
financing provides a similar proportion. This is compared to only 1% in middle-income countries where national funding capacity 
(public and private) is much higher.
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sources of funding are very heterogeneous, varying from one country to another. 
The mobilization of domestic resources is not a rhetorical agenda or an excuse to 
be used by impoverished international donors; it corresponds to the proximity of 
the readily available resources. 
Given the accounting difficulties associated with balancing needs and funding 
opportunities, the need for the diversification of sources blurs the distinction between 
public and private sources – a distinction that has been the essential reference of 
ODA since 1972. In a dynamic perspective, what matters more is the nature of 
funding and whether a financial return on investment is expected or not, and with 
what yield. Taken to its extreme, this distinction in the nature of funds requires 
an answer to the question of who ultimately pays: the taxpayer or the user? Like 
Russian dolls, this question contains other questions, is the taxpayer from the North 
or the South? Is it the rich user or the poor user...? SDGs funding in the long term is 
comparable to the issuance of a debt for which the underwriters and the schedule 
must be specified from the outset. 
Discussions on development financing are not new. The latest commitments of 
the international community date back to the Monterrey Conference in 2001 in 
the wake of the MDGs. As a reminder, the discussions were focused around six 
means of action: 1/ mobilizing domestic public and private financial resources; 
2/ mobilizing international private financing; 3/ the role of trade; 4/ official 
development assistance and other innovative sources of international public finance; 
5/ management of external debts; and 6/ international financial governance. The 
MDGs have undoubtedly led to a refocusing of assistance on some priorities, but they 
did not have the desired effect on the overall resource mobilization and its geographic 
allocation (Figure 3) (Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2013; UNGA, 2014). A paradox of 
the current situation is that ODA funding capacities have never seemed so limited 
considering the scale of the issues and the potential private contributions, and never 
as essential given the challenges of designing and implementing alternatives and 
autonomous financing modalities – including innovative financing.
BOX 1 THE DYNAMIC PROBLEM
Ongoing public private partner-
ships demonstrate that the inflow 
of private capital in the form of 
grants or investments towards the 
SDGs cannot be taken for granted 
and that the SDGs and countries 
will not receive equal shares from 
the available capital.
The accounting perspective also 
suffers from a number of short-
comings. It is not very prescriptive, 
given the state of knowledge of the 
exact needs that each country asso-
ciates with the different SDGs. The 
level of ignorance on this matter 
leads donor countries to adopt a 
cautious stance, stating that SDGs, 
in the same way as the MDGs, 
cannot be ‘bought’. The accounting 
perspective, by dealing with large 
masses, complicates more than it 
facilitates the political discussion, 
confining it to humble injunctions 
to the fund holders. Finally, this 
approach leads to implementa-
tion problems being hastily iden-
tified as funding problems, disre-
garding the thorny question of 
how. In short, once the money is 
there, what do we do with it?
FIGURE 3 Mapping the financial resources
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The roles of ODA in the ecosystem of development 
finance
How can a large pool of savings be redirected into long-term investments 
(Glachant, Lorenzi, Quinet, Trainar, 2010)? This universal challenge is partic-
ularly difficult for LDCs for several reasons: 1/ almost all of these savings are 
located in developed and emerging countries; and 2/ competition on the global 
savings market between developed and emerging countries increases the proba-
bility of an exclusion of the poorest countries, that already exists – according 
to the paradox highlighted by Lucas (1990). Global capital does not flow into 
sectors and regions where it is most scarce and where, in theory, for this reason, 
its marginal returns should be the highest.6 At the heart of the Lucas paradox is 
the risk, or rather the uncertainty: too many uninsurable risks deter investors 
from undercapitalized sectors and regions. In other words, money goes to money 
– and economists from Lucas to Piketty have documented to varying degrees of 
6.  For further explanation of recent examples, see Azemar and Desbordes, 2013.
This map shows the priority allocation of international funding. It reads as follows: migrant remittances are the largest source of external 
financing in Nigeria, ODA is the main source of external financing of Benin and Mali. ODA is the main source of external financing of 
continental Africa, private external financing remains predominant in Latin America and Asia.
FIGURE 4 The nature of financial flows to developing countries
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refinement and elegance the concentration of wealth regardless (or almost) of 
merit and needs over time.
Can ODA contravene the fatal law of capitalism, can it reduce risk and bring closer 
together the expected return on capital and its theoretical return? What actions 
should be funded for this purpose – because it is understood that it is not the role 
for public subsidies to replace private capital – in order to increase private flows, 
which are the majority in gross volumes directed to developing countries (Figure 4)? 
What multiplier effect can be expected? 
For example, it is often suggested that feasibility studies for infrastructure projects 
should be financed by public funds to facilitate private investment, which is typically 
between 5% and 10% of the total project cost. The multiplier effect can then reach 
1:20 – which is huge – if the project is then funded entirely by private means. The 
EU experience of blended finance has demonstrated attractive ratios (1:30), but 
these ratios can decrease drastically (1:8) depending on the method of calculation 
used (Bilal and Krätke, 2013). Furthermore, most blended financing mechanisms 
set up by the EU almost exclusively involve public finance partners, which means 
Taken together, developing countries are the recipients of international financial flows that are primarily private (FDI remittances). ODA 
is marginal in terms of international flows and its relative contribution has shrunk significantly since the mid-2000s with the exponen-
tial growth of private funding to middle income countries.
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that the above mentioned ratios provide a rather poor estimate of how much private 
financing can be leveraged by blending. This highlights the different definitions of 
blended finance: it can mean a blending of grants and loans (within a given institution 
or across different institutions – public or private) or a blending of public/private 
financing, or a combination of the two. 
Other case studies presented by the World Economic Forum as successful examples 
of public-private partnership suggest that such a ratio is exceptionally high and cannot 
be generalized for all sectors (WEF, 2013). The World Economic Forum report gives 
some order of magnitude derived from projects on photovoltaic infrastructure (India), 
water treatment (Jordan) and agricultural development (Tanzania): the ratio is very 
high in the first case, 1:44, but it drops to 1:13 in the second example, and 1:1.6 in the 
last (WEF, 2013). 
Therefore, it is possible to distinguish at least two roles for ODA, without these roles 
being mutually exclusive. The first aims to directly promote capital inflows towards 
developing countries by tackling the failures that affect the project cycle – asymmetric 
information, moral hazard, lack of collateral, etc. It may then involve either the direct 
reduction of the risks associated with project development (financing of all or part of 
the R&D, of the feasibility studies or pilot projects) or responding to market failures 
(concessional loans, offer of warranty, etc.) and creating the necessary capital inflow 
conditions, by addressing the factors explaining the Lucas Paradox: availability of human 
capital that is additional to the flow of physical capital, quality of institutions, role of 
macro-economic policies, etc. (Azemar and Desbordes, 2013). In this perspective, the 
strengthening of institutions and the funding of public policies are essential, although 
they are targets for which ODA performance is difficult to measure (Treyer et al., 2014; 
Voituriez et al., forthcoming)7.
The second role is to influence the direct mobilization of the available funds by putting 
development agencies at the heart of intermediation and financial innovation (Tomasi, 
2013). In practice, this consists of aid agencies purchasing securities issued by companies 
and issuing others to investors, while ensuring a better sharing of long-term risks between 
underwriters. A few examples are provided below.
Green bonds issued by the World Bank or the European Investment Bank are part 
of the process. However, their volume is limited, although undergoing rapid growth 
– the World Bank has issued $6.4 billion of green bonds since 2008, including $3 
billion in 2013/2014 – and most importantly, these bonds have, until now, only been 
used to fund projects in middle-income countries (World Bank, 2014a). In September 
2014, the French Development Agency issued its first climate bonds at €1 billion for 
a ten-year maturity.
In the health sector, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) 
was created in 2006, which differs from climate bonds insofar as it is a pre-financing 
mechanism. It issues bonds that enable the funding of the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), the 
7.  This can be illustrated in the health sector, where strengthening health institutions for instance provides long-term and 
heterogeneous results which are difficult to measure with a simple metric. 
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bonds being secured by future donor commitments. The Alliance was founded on the 
assumption that the financial cost of borrowing on the capital markets will remain below 
the benefits associated with obtaining the full amount promised at the beginning of 
the period and with the deductibility of aid. While GAVI is presented as a classic public-
private partnership, it differs from this description in practice because the risk is not 
borne by the private sector but by the public sector. Therefore, the ability of the IFFIm 
to raise funds ultimately depends on the creditworthiness of the donor states: IFFIm has 
been rated AAA by the rating agencies, which explains its success. A rating downgrade, 
that could follow the downgrade of a contributor’s rating, could undermine the initiative. 
The replication of this initiative in other sectors (climate, infrastructure or education) is 
not a trivial matter (Ketkar, 2014): firstly, the benefit of having all pledges in advance 
must be demonstrated for sectors other than health; secondly, the credibility of donor 
pledges could erode as their number increases to cover the various SDGs.
This initiative has led to the extension of advanced financing mechanisms by the private 
sector based on guarantees from either the public sector (donor or recipient countries) or 
private non-profit organizations (foundations): the Development Impact Bonds (Center 
for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013). These bonds are accompanied by 
performance targets that are measurable on the model of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). 
There are SIBs pilots in the field of health, housing, education and justice services. A 
first experience of SIBs was recently launched in the education sector in India.8
It is fair to say that many innovations have emerged in recent years in terms of 
development finance. However, specific to certain sectors or certain problems, they 
are far from being transferable to others. Without providing a blueprint – in particular 
for the thematic funds – these innovations have had the benefit of encouraging the 
self-examination of donors, without leading to a profound revision of the objectives, 
means and practices that would today enable the huge needs of SGDs to be met. 
Conclusion
ODA seems essential for the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, to directly 
finance projects, programmes and policies and to attract funding, and also to ensure 
that funds, regardless of their origin, ‘produce’ development. We have also seen that 
ODA has been too low in comparison to the needs, and therefore should (non-exclu-
sively) either be increased (as was done in the UK) or be used as a vehicle of mobili-
zation, with conclusive examples that can be demonstrated.
However, questions remain beyond this observation. Is blended finance the 
appropriate vehicle to finance sustainable development in LDCs? Are there specific 
experiences transposable to other countries, other sectors and other scales (in terms 
of volume mobilized)? Beyond blended finance and public-private partnerships, 
which assessment methods and learning frameworks should be used? Can an 
assessment of the relevance of different funding instruments be carried out according 
to each country and sector? 
8.  http://www.cgdev.org/blog/first-development-impact-bond-launched
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Our review raises one last important issue, that of tools for joint experiments 
(from research to implementation) and learning. Building capacity in developing 
countries, and particularly in LDCs, to plan and mobilize funding with the priority 
given to domestic resources is a pre-requisite for making the post-2015 agenda 
really deliver. ❚ 
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